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ABSTRACT 
Privacy is not just about what an individual user discloses about 
herself, it also involves what her friends may disclose about her. 
Multiparty privacy is concerned with information pertaining to 
several individuals and the conflicts that arise when the privacy 
preferences of these individuals differ. Social media has 
significantly exacerbated multiparty privacy conflicts because 
many items shared are co-owned among multiple individuals. In 
this paper, we discuss the limited support for multiparty privacy 
offered by social media sites, the coping strategies users resort to 
in absence of more advanced support, and current research on 
multiparty privacy management and its limitations. We then 
outline a set of requirements to design multiparty privacy 
management tools.  
INTRODUCTION 
Over 2 billion users utilise social media to build and participate in 
Online Social Networks (OSNs), uploading and sharing hundreds 
of billions of data items [15]. OSNs are, therefore, huge in scale 
and they are only predicted to keep growing in the forthcoming 
years both in the number of users and in the amount of data users 
upload and share. The huge amount of data in social media is 
user-generated and personal most of the time, which clearly calls 
for appropriate privacy preservation mechanisms that allow users 
to benefit from social media while adequately protecting their 
personal information. Protecting users’ privacy is not only 
essential to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
but also to serve as a first-line defence to mitigate cybercrime and 
other illegal activities that leverage the data obtained due to 
privacy breaches in social media, such as social phishing, identity 
theft, cyberstalking, cyberbullying, etc. 
There have been many efforts devoted to study privacy in social 
media and how to protect users’ personal information since the 
very early days of social media such as [10]. However, most of 
these efforts have focused on privacy from an individual point of 
view. For instance, advances include research [9] and industry 
[16] efforts on helping individual users better target their audience 
by modelling different relationships and social circles beyond the 
binary friendship model that is prevalent in most social media.  
While this has indeed helped to advance the state of the art on the 
topic, the problem of content affecting the privacy of more than 
one user at the same time has received little attention. 
Privacy is not just about what you say or disclose about yourself. 
It is also about what others say or disclose about you. Evidence 
shows there are privacy boundaries that are collectively held and 
managed by individuals within relationships, families, groups, and 
organisations [23]. With the massive growth of Social Media, 
however, collectively held privacy boundaries have become 
extremely challenging to maintain, as many of the hundreds of 
billions of items uploaded to social media are co-owned by 
multiple users [15][14], yet mainstream social media only allow 
the user uploading a co-owned data item to set its privacy settings, 
which often leads to conflicts and severe privacy violations 
[35][33]. Multiparty privacy (MP) aims to facilitate the 
coordination of collectively held privacy boundaries by all 
individuals that co-own a data item online, as the privacy of all of 
them may be at stake depending on with whom the co-owned data 
item is shared1. MP particularly focuses on supporting the 
detection and resolution of multiparty privacy conflicts (MPCs), 
when individuals whose privacy may be affected by the same co-
owned data item have conflicting privacy preferences. Take a 
simplified but illustrative example of MPC: Alice takes a photo of 
her and Bob. Mainstream social media would only allow Alice 
(assuming she uploads the photo) to set the privacy settings for 
the photo, but what if Bob would not like to share it with some of 
the friends Alice would like to share the photo with? MP is 
concerned with not only photos but also other social media 
content such as posts, videos, comments, events, etc. Beyond 
social media, MP could also be useful in other social computing 
domains, in which information is co-created and co-owned by 
multiple users, so all these users should have a say on to whom 
this information is shared, such as collaborative software (e.g. 
cloud-based collaborative documents), cloud-based file sharing 
[24], internal/external wiki pages, blogs, collective intelligence, 
crowdsourcing, etc.  
Designing MP tools is a complex and difficult task, as users have 
different privacy attitudes and preferences; they socialise online 
with multiple types of relationships; and they share varying 
amounts of different types of content. In this paper, we discuss the 
limited MP support users have nowadays, the coping strategies 
users are forced to resort to in the absence of adequate MP 
support, and the latest developments in MP mechanisms and tools. 
Based on this, we outline a roadmap for future research with a set 
of requirements for developing MP tools. 
SOCIAL MEDIA SUPPORT FOR MP  
Mainstream social media sites support some sort for MP, which 
mainly comes in the form of two mechanisms: (i) 
tagging/untagging; and (ii) reporting inappropriate content.  
Tags are normally used to name people that appear in a photo with 
a link to their profile. People tagged in a photo can, however, 
untag themselves from the photo. There are some social media 
sites (like Facebook) in which you can opt-in to receive 
                                                                  
1 MP is different from other collective approaches that focus on 
protecting just one individual, e.g., [4],[6],[21]. 
notifications about the photos you have been tagged in to approve 
tags before they become effective. Tagging/untagging represents 
some sort of MP, but it has three main limitations. The first 
limitation is that even if you untag yourself from a photo before 
anyone seeing it, this does not mean that your friends will not end 
up seeing the photo anyway. For instance, Alice and Bob are in a 
photo that Alice uploads to Facebook tagging Bob in it. Bob 
receives a notification, he revises the photo and decides not to 
approve the tag, e.g., because he feels embarrassed about the 
photo. The point is that the photo, even without Bob being 
explicitly tagged, will be shared according to what Alice decides. 
That is, if Alice decides to share with her friends, and Alice and 
Bob share some friends, all these friends will be able to see the 
photo in Alice’s wall anyway. The second limitation is that 
tagging/untagging is supported for photos but not for other items 
such as posts, comments, events. Posts and comments do usually 
have the option to include mentions (using special symbols such 
as ‘@’), but these mentions are only controllable by the 
post/comment creator – though users can remove comments to 
their posts/photos. Finally, many users state that they feel very 
uncomfortable untagging themselves from photos because it may 
offend (from a social angle) the person who tagged them in the 
photo [2]. 
Regarding reporting, most social media sites allow users to report 
when content published by others is not appropriate. This 
mechanism is mainly used to deal with highly inappropriate (or 
even illegal) content such as nudity, hate speech, violence, and 
other very serious offences. After being reported, the provider 
decides unilaterally what to do with the content (delete it or not). 
Although this mechanism is of utmost importance to fight against 
these very serious offences, it is not appropriate for all MP 
scenarios, as there are many cases in which privacy violations can 
happen without necessarily being related to these offences. For 
instance, it may just be the case that you are not comfortable 
sharing some information with some other people, or you want to 
conceal information from your work colleagues, etc. Also, it is 
important to highlight that reporting is only a reactive mechanism, 
which only activates after content has already been published and 
someone flags it as inappropriate. However, when the content is 
flagged, it may well be too late, the privacy violation may have 
already happened and the derived consequences may be 
unrecoverable, or other users may have been able to download the 
content and distribute it using other channels.  
The problem of MP starts being recognised by mainstream social 
media as demonstrated by the latest re-vamp of Facebook’s 
privacy controls2. In particular, Facebook’s Privacy Basics now 
explains the newly-introduced option to contact users about 
photos you do not like. The mechanism works as follows, if a user 
is tagged in a photo and she does not like the photo, she can now 
flag the photo as not liking it, which then opens up a message 
window containing a form with the recipient field set to the one 
who uploaded the photo, so that the user who does not like the 
photo can ask the user who uploaded it to remove it and include 
an optional reason for the removal. Although this is a step forward 
which very much recognises the issue of MP, it still falls short 
because of multiple reasons, some of them also shared with 
tagging/untagging and reporting inappropriate content: (i) the 
process happens once the photo has already been published, so 
any potential privacy breaches may have already occurred; (ii) it 
takes time to take down a photo that has already been published -- 
                                                                  
2 https://www.facebook.com/about/basics/how-others-interact-with-you/ 
e.g., Lian et al. [19] calculated the time it takes for a photo URL 
to become unavailable after having deleted the photo from the 
social media site, which turned out to be 3 days on Instagram, 7 
days on Facebook, 14 days on Flickr and over 30 days in 
MySpace and Tumblr; (iii) it does not enable collective 
negotiation, as the photo may involve other people and not only 
the one who uploaded it and the one who complains about it; (iv) 
everything needs to be done manually, which introduces an 
unbearable burden on the users considering the large amount of 
friends users have online; and (v) this mechanism has only been 
implemented for photos but not for other types of content such as 
posts, comments, events, etc. 
USER COPING STRATEGIES FOR MP  
As shown above, there is a distinct lack of built-in capabilities in 
current social media infrastructures to help users compromise by 
actively negotiating with others [40]. Users are forced to 
communicate outside social media and apply a number of coping 
strategies to try to overcome or work around that lack of technical 
support. Basically, most of these coping strategies consist of 
actions or behaviours in the offline world that aim to prevent 
MPCs from happening online. Research uncovered several 
examples of these coping strategies, which very much stress the 
need for MP tools. We discuss some examples of coping 
strategies and their shortcomings next (summarised in Table 1).  
Table 1. Examples of coping strategies  
Strategy Main Drawbacks 
Try to anticipate 
consequences for 
others [18] 
Impossible to always anticipate privacy 
consequences. 
Seek approval before 
posting [18] 
Too much burden on the user that 
uploads the item. 
Inside jokes and 
cloaking [3] 
It does not scale and it is not feasible 
for some types of content. 
Alternative sharing 
media [2] 
MPCs can happen in other media too. 
Also, one user cannot control which 
media others use to share content. 
Change offline 
behaviour when 
cameras around 
[2][18] 
Very difficult due to the pervasiveness 
of smart phones and wearables. 
Negotiation of a 
shared policy with 
other users 
[40][18][2] 
It could easily become a burden on the 
users due to the amount of co-owned 
content. 
 
One of the offline strategies people utilise before posting an item 
to avoid MPCs is trying to anticipate whether the item could be 
sensitive to anyone potentially affected by it [18]. For instance, if 
Alice and Bob appear together in a photo but Bob appears clearly 
inebriated, then it is likely that Alice may consider this by either 
not posting the photo or sharing it only with a restricted number of 
friends. However, this does not always work, as sometimes the 
person to post an item cannot anticipate the consequences this 
may have for others beforehand. An example is given in [18], a 
person was congratulated by a friend about being accepted for a 
Masters programme via a comment, but the person had to quickly 
remove the comment as he had not yet told his employer about it 
and his employer was also friend of his online. Note even if the 
person removed the comment quickly, there was still the risk that 
his employer may have already noticed the comment before being 
removed.  
Users sometimes ask the other co-owners of an item for approval 
before sharing it [18]. The problem with this strategy is that it is 
done offline without any technical means that could facilitate this. 
That is, one would need to ask permission offline to all people 
that may be affected by each and every item they upload. Also, 
when somebody was not ok, they would need to negotiate a 
solution (e.g., reduce the initial audience, decide not to upload, 
etc.). This would quickly become an unbearable burden on users. 
It has also been observed that teens cloak their messages and 
share photos with inside jokes [3]. For instance, Boyd and 
Marwick [3] report an example of a girl writing a post in 
Facebook about something she knew only her close friends would 
understand, as she wanted to prevent other friends from knowing 
what she actually meant. The downside of this strategy is that it 
clearly does not scale and may not be feasible for all photos or 
other types of items that people would like to share. For example, 
a photo about your travel to Mauritius cannot be easily cloaked in 
case you want to share it with some people but not with others.  
As social media proves inadequate to manage disclosures in MP 
scenarios, some users switch media to share content using other 
technologies such as cloud-based file sharing, instant messaging, 
or e-mail attachments [2]. This has the advantage of protecting not 
only their own content but also limiting the privacy risks for 
others. There are, however, three main disadvantages as well. 
Firstly, this may be possible for photos, videos, etc. but not for 
other types of content such as events, comments, etc. Secondly, 
users cannot control which technologies their friends use; i.e., 
their friends could still upload photos using social media without 
users being able to do anything about it. Thirdly, these 
technologies might also lead themselves to MPCs. For instance, 
one user may share a video in a Whatsapp group in which there 
are people with whom other users in the video would not like to 
share it.  
Users also confirmed that, in the absence of better ways to 
manage MP situations, they actually change and tightly control 
their offline behaviour. For example, people behave in a different 
way when they see a camera around [2][18]. If you know a friend 
likes to take photos and posts them very often, you may decide 
not to hang out with her to avoid any undesired photos being 
posted. This highlights the extent to which people feel unable to 
participate in MP decisions. The effectiveness of this strategy is 
again very limited, mainly due to the pervasiveness of smart 
phones and wearable devices, being always alert and constantly 
modifying your offline behaviour is infeasible.  
One of the most interesting strategies perhaps is that users 
collectively negotiate and achieve offline agreements and 
compromises about what gets posted and to whom it gets shared 
[40][18][2]. For instance, a group of friends could agree that the 
photos they take in a trip can only be shared among them or with 
close friends of them. Interestingly, it turns out users are always 
very open to consider and accommodate others’ preferences as 
much as possible [40][18]. In addition, research uncovered that 
users do not want to cause any deliberate harm to their friends and 
will normally listen to reasonable objections, which also acts as a 
way of reaffirming and reciprocating relationships [40]. The main 
problem with this strategy, as with many of the other strategies 
seen so far, is that it does not scale. It is impossible for users to be 
constantly negotiating with hundreds of friends about hundreds of 
photos without technical aid.  
RESEARCH ON MP TOOLS 
It seems clear considering all the cases above that users actively 
seek to work around the problem of not having adequate technical 
support for MP. However, the effectiveness of the coping 
strategies they use for this seems rather limited according to the 
drawbacks these strategies have. This has inspired researchers to 
design interfaces and computational methods that empower users 
to collectively manage MP in more effective and efficient ways 
than the current coping strategies they are nowadays forced to 
resort to. Although research on this area is still in its infancy, there 
have been a number of proposals that we categorise below into 5 
main approaches (summarised in Table 2), highlighting their 
strengths and limitations. Note that other works in addition to 
those discussed have also been published but we could not include 
all of them due to the space and maximum references allowed, 
and have instead included those we considered the most 
representative of each approach. 
Manual approaches. The first research stream proposed support 
for MP by helping users to identify where MPCs can or did occur 
[2][39]. For instance, [39] presents a way to specify strong and 
weak sharing preferences so that these preferences could be 
inspected to find conflicts. Also, [2] introduces a system whereby 
users tagged in a photo can contact the user who uploaded the 
photo to ask to remove it or to restrict the audience of the photo, 
which resembles the functionality Facebook introduced some time 
later [7]. While these approaches represented a stepping stone, 
recognised the problem of MP, and proposed a partial solution to 
it; they left all the negotiation process to resolve detected conflicts 
to happen without any particular technical aid. That is, users need 
to resolve every potential MPC in a manual way, which may 
become an unbearable burden considering the massive amount of 
content uploaded and the number of friends that users have in 
social media.  
Auction-based approaches. Another research stream proposed 
solving potential MPCs using a bidding mechanism [30]. Users 
bid for the sharing decision they would prefer the most and the 
winning bid determines the sharing decision that will be taken for 
a particular item. These approaches were the first ones to consider 
a semi-automated method to aid users in collectively defining a 
sharing decision – e.g., the outcome of the auction is computed 
automatically from the bids users specify. However, users may 
have difficulties to comprehend the mechanism and specify 
appropriate bid values in auctions, and users are required to bid 
for each and every item co-owned with others.  
Aggregation-based approaches. These approaches suggest a 
solution to a MPC by aggregating the individual privacy 
preferences of all users involved. They can be abstractly 
conceptualised as voting mechanisms, where the preferences of 
each user affected by an item count as one vote (sometimes 
weighted) for sharing/not sharing. Then, a voting rule models how 
each of these mechanisms aggregates votes together. For instance, 
in majority voting [5], the preference of the majority of users is 
taken as the decision to be applied to the content. Another 
example would be veto voting [35], so that if there is one of the 
users affected by the content who opposes sharing, then the 
content is not shared. The main problem with these approaches is 
that they always aggregate preferences in the very same way. For 
instance, using majority voting always means that even when 
content can be very sensitive and lead to privacy violations for 
one user, it will be shared if the majority of users wishes to. In 
contrast, always using veto voting may be too restrictive and 
impact the known benefits users get from sharing in social media 
[29]. Subsequent works [12] do recognise this issue and consider 
more than one way of aggregating user preferences. However, it is 
up to the one who uploads the item to decide the aggregation 
method to apply. This requires the user who uploads the item to 
anticipate the consequences for others, which may be a very 
difficult task as discussed above, and it may not always render the 
optimal solution. 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of MP approaches with example references 
Approach Short Description Main Drawbacks 
Manual 
[2][39] 
Users are provided with a way of detecting MPCs, and they 
can manually resolve them when detected.  
It may easily become a burden on the users, as they 
do not provide automated support for conflict 
resolution. 
Auction-based 
[30] 
Users gain fictitious money that they can invest in auctions 
bidding for the most desired sharing decision for co-owned 
items. 
Users may have difficulties to understand and 
manage the process appropriately.  
Aggregation-based 
[5][35][12] 
Individual privacy preferences of all users are aggregated 
using a rule or set of rules to produce a joint sharing 
decision. 
Individual privacy preferences are aggregated in the 
same way or the uploader chooses the method to 
aggregate.   
Adaptive 
[32] 
Different situations are modelled based on a number of 
factors and a different sharing decision is suggested 
depending on the situation. 
It is difficult to model all possible factors that 
determine a situation and the best method to 
achieve an optimal sharing decision. 
Game-theoretic 
[13][31][17][25] 
Users or automated software agents negotiate a solution 
following an established protocol. Both the protocol and 
the negotiation strategies are analysed using game-theoretic 
solution concepts.   
Users’ behaviour in social media seems not to be 
perfectly rational as there are many very social 
idiosyncrasies that play a role in MP. 
Fine-grained 
[14][36] 
Users define individualised access control decisions over 
personally-identifying objects within a photo, e.g. users 
deciding whether or not their faces are blurred. 
Blurring objects (e.g. faces) within a photo may not 
be the optimal solution in terms of the utility of the 
information shared and/or protecting users’ privacy.  
 
Adaptive approaches. These approaches automatically infer the 
best way to solve a MPC based on the particular situation [32]. 
These approaches model a situation considering factors such as 
the individual preferences of each user, the sensitivity of the 
content, the relationships to the potential audience, etc. Then, a 
particular situation instantiates particular concessions that are 
known to happen when people negotiate offline an agreement 
about sharing co-owned items [40][18][2]. Thus, these approaches 
automatically adapt to the situation at hand, turning as restrictive 
as veto voting if the situation requires so (e.g., if the item is very 
sensitive), or suggesting sharing in other situations (e.g., someone 
having special interest in sharing and the others not caring much 
about it). While these approaches capture the known situations of 
when concessions happen during offline negotiations, it is 
difficult to model all possible situations, and they may not capture 
opportunistic concessions or agreements that may arise in 
potentially unknown situations. 
Game-theoretic approaches. Another approach has been to 
define negotiation protocols, which are a means of standardising 
the communication between participants in the process of 
negotiating a solution to a MPC by defining how the participants 
can interact with each other. These protocols are then enacted by 
users themselves manually [15] or automatically by software 
agents [31][17] to negotiate an agreed sharing decision for a 
particular item. Participants can follow different strategies when 
enacting the negotiation protocols, and these strategies are 
analysed using well-known game-theoretic solution concepts such 
as the Nash equilibrium. This allows, for instance, to determine 
analytically which are the best strategies that participants can play 
as well as to find strategies that are stable (strategies in which no 
participant has anything to gain by changing only her own 
strategy unilaterally). While these proposals provided elegant 
frameworks from a formal point of view and build upon well-
studied analytic tools, they may not work well when used in 
practice [13]. This is because users’ behaviour does not seem 
perfectly rational in practice (as assumed in these approaches), 
and even if some are starting to consider other factors like 
reciprocity [17] and social pressure [25], they are still far from 
considering the many very social idiosyncrasies that play a role in 
MP [18][40]. 
Fine-grained approaches. The last research stream focuses on 
preventing MPCs by allowing each user in a photo to 
independently decide whether some personally-identifying objects 
within the photo are shown or blurred [14][36]. In particular, one 
of the first works in this approach allowed users to individually 
decide whether their face is shown or blurred [14]. The process 
works as follows: 1) the users in a photo are identified using face 
recognition algorithms such as Facebook’s DeepFace algorithm 
[34]; 2) the users recognised are notified and they can suggest the 
list of friends who can have access to the photo; 3) when a user 
wants to access a photo, she will only see the faces of the users 
that have granted access to her and the other faces in the photo 
will appear blurred. However, blurring faces (or other objects in a 
photo) may impact the utility of the photo being shared, 
negatively impacting the benefits people get by sharing in social 
media [29], and there is also the risk that a person can be re-
identified even if her face (or other objects in a photo) has been 
blurred [22]. Hence, when a collaboratively-agreed solution to a 
MPC is possible, that solution might be more desirable than 
enforcing access separately, as the photo will not lose any utility 
(no object blurred) but the audience of the photo will be 
negotiated to remove access to any undesired people. 
REQUIREMENTS FOR MP TOOLS 
Building upon the previous analysis on existing approaches and 
their limitations, we now outline a set of requirements to develop 
MP tools that empower users to collectively manage their privacy 
together with others and overcome these limitations. These tools 
would aid end-users to identify potential MPCs and, when MPCs 
are identified, provide support for their resolution (e.g. in the form 
of recommendations), allowing an appropriate “boundary 
regulation process by actively negotiating one’s boundaries with 
others” [40]. Next, we describe with more detail each of the 
requirements. 
Design informed by real-world empirical data 
None of the existing approaches are grounded on a deep 
understanding of MPCs and their optimal solution in practice. 
This is in part due to not having enough empirical evidence about 
MPCs yet. Such an empirical base is utterly essential to inform the 
design of MP tools that overcome the limitations identified in the 
existing literature. As mentioned above, researchers have shed 
light on how users are forced online to resort to coping strategies 
to work around the lack of appropriate support for MP 
[3][18][40][2], and there is evidence of how collectively held 
privacy boundaries are managed offline [23]. While this previous 
research already provides a very good foundation to build upon, 
further research is needed to better understand when and how 
often MPCs actually happen online and, more importantly, when 
they become a problem or lead to potential privacy violations and 
hence need a solution. Particular instances of MPCs users faced 
could be studied to understand whether they happened despite 
coping strategies being used, how users came up or would come 
up with the optimal solution for the MPCs studied, and the factors 
that played a role in the process. Some very recent research goes 
in this direction [33], having contributed the first empirical and 
public dataset of MPCs. Having this empirical base about MPCs 
would ultimately underpin a thorough understanding of MPCs and 
the nuanced factors that affect them from the ground up, which 
could then be used as the basis to design MP tools that offer 
support to different types of users, social groups and relationships 
and can recommend optimal solutions to MPCs. Recent efforts on 
privacy engineering should be leveraged to easy the challenging 
task of going from empirical evidence to privacy design [11].  
User-centric MP controls 
The main challenge here is how to develop usable MP tools in line 
with the empirical base mentioned above, so users could 
effectively manage MP with minimal effort.  However, MP tools 
should aim for usability without becoming a fully automated 
solution, as this may not achieve satisfactory results when it 
comes to privacy in social media. Instead, users may have to 
provide some input into MP tools, which will then provide a 
recommendation, as very recent research has shown that the 
optimal solution for an MP conflict could be predicted given some 
input from the users, like the reason for their preferred privacy 
policy [8]. However, if users have to intervene to express their 
individual privacy preferences and/or to accept/decline the 
solution recommended for each and every co-owned item and 
potential conflict, would this not easily become a burden on the 
users? How do we find adequate trade-offs between intervention 
and automation? There are previous studies on individual privacy 
in social media that could help for this: i) tools like 
AudienceView [20] could be used to show and/or modify the 
suggested solution or express individual preferences; ii) 
approaches similar to [7] could be used to learn the way users 
respond to MP over time; and iii) approaches like [38] could be 
used to create suitable defaults for MP settings.  
Scaled-up and comparable evaluations 
The existing approaches for MP presented above were either not 
evaluated empirically with users ([5][17][25][30][31][39]) or the 
user studies conducted were low-scale with at most 50 
participants  ([2][12][13][14][32][36]). This is in part due to a 
distinct lack of systematic and repeatable methods and/or 
protocols to evaluate MP tools and compare them to each other.  
In order for evaluations to be more conclusive and generalizable, 
MP tools should be evaluated considering wider and more varied 
populations. Also, evaluation protocols should be developed with 
a view to maximise ecological validity, which is particularly 
challenging in this domain. Firstly, participants in user studies 
would always seem reluctant to share sensitive information with 
researchers [37] (e.g., photos they feel embarrassed about and 
prefer not sharing online), which would bias any evaluations 
towards non-sensitive issues only, leaving out the scenarios where 
the adequate performance of MP tools would be critical. An 
alternative could be evaluations with fake data/scenarios where 
participants self-report how they would behave, but the results 
may not match participants’ actual behaviour in practice due to 
the well-known dichotomy between privacy attitudes and 
behaviour [1]. Secondly, conducting MP evaluations in the wild is 
very difficult, as it would require all the users affected by a 
particular piece of content to be studied together to understand the 
conflicts and whether the solutions to the conflicts are optimal. A 
possible way forward could be methodologies based on living 
labs, which would integrate and validate research in evolving real 
life contexts. 
Privacy-enhanced party recognition 
Given a particular item uploaded, MP tools should derive the 
users who are affected by the item. For instance, if a user uploads 
a photo and tags in it all the other users that appear in the photo, 
MP tools can directly use this to know which users are involved. 
However, users many times either do not tag all people clearly 
identifiable in a photo or incorrectly tag people who actually do 
not appear in the photo. Face recognition software could be used 
for this, such as the one developed by Facebook researchers called 
DeepFace [34], which has 97.35% accuracy. The question that 
arises is whether using face recognition software could be too 
privacy invasive for individuals, i.e., the social media provider 
would be able to identify individuals in any photo even for photos 
outside the social media infrastructure, or individuals could be 
misidentified and wrongly associated with items that are not 
relevant to them (note even if accuracy of face recognition is high 
and false positives are low, the number of items and users is 
huge). Interestingly, this seems to open a completely new and 
exciting type of privacy-related trade-off compared to the well-
known privacy-utility trade-off, which would be multiparty vs. 
individual privacy. Note, however, that a multiparty-individual 
privacy trade-off will not be needed if privacy-preserving face 
recognition methods [27] are used by MP tools, so that parties 
would be recognised while preserving their privacy. Beyond 
photos, party recognition may be easier for some content type 
such as events (people invited or attending are explicitly 
mentioned) or even more challenging for some other content such 
as text posts, in which affected users may not always be explicitly 
tagged.  
Support for inferential privacy 
Another issue not considered before in a MP context is that of 
inferential privacy. That is, it may not only be about what your 
friends say about you online, but also what it may be inferred 
from what they said regardless of the type of content. For 
instance, Sarigol et al. [27] have demonstrated the feasibility of 
constructing shadow profiles of sexual orientation for users and 
non-users, using data from more than 3 Million accounts of a 
single OSN. Note that negotiations or agreements for the case of 
inferential privacy may be more complex, as the reasons not to 
publish content may not be about the content itself but more about 
the consequences in terms of the information that may be inferred 
from it, so solutions to this type of MPC might be more difficult 
to comprehend by users, which would also challenge the usability 
and understandability of MP tools. Also, we are unaware of any 
social media site that provides users with any sort of controls for 
inferential privacy; let alone any research conducted that 
considers both MP and inferential privacy together. 
Privacy-preservation guarantees 
Last but not least, MP tools should provide some sort of 
individual privacy guarantees. This is particularly important when 
a multiparty agreement is not possible. For instance, a user may 
be posting on purpose content that defames another user. In these 
cases, there may be room for enforcing individual privacy 
preferences to some extent. For instance, a possible solution for 
photos is the work already mentioned above [14], which would 
allow users to control whether their face is shown or blurred in a 
particular photo. This seems an appropriate solution when a MP 
conflict arises and no agreement is found by the users affected, so 
instead of the winner taking it all, the outcome is that all users 
affected are guaranteed their individual privacy to some extent. 
This, however, does not completely remove the identification 
risks, as acknowledged by the authors of [14], because there is 
still the chance the user may be recognised even after her face has 
been blurred [26], and approaches that are able to remove the full 
body of a person and reconstruct the image are still not there, 
though there are approaches that already recognise user’s 
body/gesture [28].  
CONCLUSION 
Multiparty privacy (MP) is an important problem in social media 
that also expands into other areas of social computing where there 
is co-owned information such as blogs, collective intelligence, 
wiki pages, and cloud-based file sharing [24] and collaborative 
documents, which have received even less attention when 
compared to social media for this matter. As highlighted in this 
paper, mainstream social media do not provide adequate support 
for MP and, as a result, users are forced to use different coping 
strategies that are far from optimal. Thus, there is a need for the 
development of novel privacy-enhancing techniques and 
mechanisms to help users to manage MP. We still have a long 
way to go to make such mechanisms a reality and embed them in 
highly usable tools ready to be utilised by end-users, partly due to 
the complex nature of MP and social behaviours, which requires 
an interdisciplinary approach to MP. In this paper, we have 
introduced the area of MP tools, discussed its current state and 
advances, and defined a set of requirements to shape the agenda 
for future research in this area. 
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